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Our "ordinary moral practice" and the "facts of ordinary moral experience," he says, contain features which are incontrovertible but mutually incompatible. 2 The features, taken individually, account for some of the basic and inalienable characteristics of our moral thought but they are, on his view, jointly inconsistent. Broadly speaking the features are objectivity and practicality. As Smith puts it: "The problem is that the objectivity and the practicality of moral judgment pull be accounted for in terms of propositional attitudes, an assumption which drives how the problem is characterized and proposed solutions to it. We need not deny that moral experience can be problematic or mysterious. The principal issue is that the standard view of what constitutes the mystery casts the problem in psychological terms, where the source of the problem is an alleged incompatibility of mental states.
2
The idea is that although our moral thought and practice is apparently coherent, it is, mysteriously, made up of elements that cannot be coherently combined. On an alternative view, moral experience and the ordinary facts which constitute it are not exhausted by our mental states and cannot be exhausted by them. Much of the basic stuff of moral experience has nothing to do with our mental life at all. The ordinary facts of moral thought, discourse, and experience are not well accounted for, let alone exhausted by facts about our mental states or propositional attitudes.
Mental States and the So-called Facts of Moral Experience
It is widely agreed that our moral experience seems at least suggests the presence of objective values, properties, events, and states of affairs. This aspect of our evaluative phenomenology finds expression in verbal forms as well is in other modes of practice.
We make assertions such as stealing is wrong and being honest is right. We think of moral judgments as true or false and use moral predicates in describing our behavior.
Our moral thought involves trying to think, talk, and act in ways that are right, where the rightness involved is taken to be independently constituted by the way the world is.
With our moral thought and discourse, we aspire to represent such objective facts which obtain, when they do, independently of our practices of representation, assertion, and description. On the standard formulation, this feature is captured by the familiar claim about our psychology that the means by which we try to represent the world correctly is by having and expressing beliefs about the world. Central to our moral experience is also a practical, motivational aspect captured by a claim about a different aspect of our psychology that moral judgment involves having and expressing desires which are constitutively motivational.
Typically, beliefs and desires share a common feature in that both have representational content, if of different sorts. Beliefs have representational content in so far as with them, we seek to represent the way the world really is. Desires have representational content in so far as with them we represent how the world is to be. Phenomenologically, beliefs and desires are not often experienced as distinct.
Someone believing that his daughter is playing the violin in a school concert is not felt as distinct from his desiring to hear her play. Such cases are part of the ordinary facts of experience. Proponents of Humean psychology insist that, despite the phenomenology, beliefs and desires can be pulled apart "at least modally," as Smith puts it. 7 The states are exclusive in that neither can fulfill the role taken by the other, and yet this fact is problematic when considering the overall nature of our moral thought and practice. In considering this, we are bound to consider both the intellectual and the practical features that in combination make up moral thought and practice, not just one of them somehow on its own. Nevertheless the assumption is that, notwithstanding the appearances, it is possible decompose the ordinary facts of moral experience into beliefs and desires, mental states the contents and roles of which are mutually exclusive. The assumption in large part serves as the source of the mystery since, given the disjunction, it is quite 5 unclear how moral experience appears simultaneously to combine both elements. This view rests on it being plausible that we can describe, interpret, and understand our moral thought and experience in terms of mental states and the relations between them.
The view is also motivated by a questionable characterization of what counts as the appearances and of what is involved in identifying them.
Psychology and Metaphysics
Let us assume that ordinary moral practice contains an objective feature and a practical feature which are "the exact opposite of each other." 8 The objective feature is partly constituted by our expressing beliefs, and the practical feature partly involves expressing our desires. Beliefs and desires are both propositional attitudes with their own distinctive forms of representational content and directions of fit. The objective feature implies that the constraint in light of which beliefs fail or succeed in being true is set by the nature of the world. It is commonly assumed that neither beliefs nor the features of the world that they are purported to represent can be intrinsically motivational. Some philosophers appeal to an alleged metaphysical truth that as a matter of fact, the world simply does not contain such features since they would breach a range of central metaphysical commitments. 9 The commitments rule out there being features of the world that are objective and practical, external to our minds yet, per impossibile, intrinsically connected to our will. Admitting such objective yet intrinsically motivating features of the world would, supposedly, contravene the best undertanding of the universe that we currently have and the best accounts of the ways in which we know about the universe. Proponents of the standard formulation could embrace this understanding through premises about the content and significance of mental states.
The strategy would thus draw metaphysical conclusions from psychological premises.
The denial that there are objective and motivational facts in the world is taken to be directly supported by psychological theory. As Smith puts it: "the standard picture of human psychology tells us that there are no such facts." 10 In looking at the nature and role of our mental states and by employing the standard theory, Humean psychology,
we can come to know that the world must be bereft of objective moral values. 
Appearances and Inner and Outer Phenomena
Advocates of the standard account propose an analysis of the elements manifest in ordinary moral practice and of the ordinary facts of moral experience. These aspects of our lives are, presumably, meant to be pre-philosophical in the sense that they are the things of which a philosophical analysis is provided. Our practice and experience constitute what is often regarded as the principal data, so to speak, for such analysis.
Conventionally the data is characterized as the elements manifest in ordinary practice.
Often competing philosophical accounts of our moral thought are assessed partly according to how successful they are in saving the appearances, the extent to which a given theory accounts for the ordinary features manifest in moral practice and experience. Whatever the credentials of this way of assessing proposed accounts of our moral thought and practice, the standard formulation of the mystery involves a mistaken focus on the appearances as they are manifested at the psychological or mental level.
The error is not that focusing on this level is mistaken as such but that the focus is It might be said in response that such things nevertheless require some kind of mental state such as a belief to mediate our access to such non-mental features or states of affairs. For instance, for rampant cruelty to figure as a constituent of moral experience we would need a belief that there is rampant cruelty in the world.
Furthermore, if mental states or propositional attitudes were needed to act as conduits for all the constituents of moral experience, then this would imply that there could be no appearances without the relevant kind of mental state to serve as mediator, no appearances if there were no mental states to illuminate them. Few philosophers would defend the idea that rampant cruelty is simply a mental state, but it is only marginally less implausible to say that cruelty appears in our moral thought and discourse only because we have beliefs that it exists and desires that we act collectively to eliminate it.
It is not a plausible view, since many things that figure in the ordinary stream of moral experience resist characterization in psychological terms.
Describing features such as non-linguistic behavior and rampant cruelty as part of the moral appearances assumes a wide-scope use of the term "appearance" that is well accommodated by what is presumably meant by the ordinary facts of moral experience.
The suggestion is not that it is never appropriate to say that beliefs mediate or constitute the appearances but that the moral appearances exceed well beyond what can be captured by applying mental state terms. There are, then, good reasons to distinguish between the different senses with which "appearance" is used. For instance, it can be used to refer to the domain of appearances appropriate to describing them in the context of thought, and it can also be used to refer to the domain of appearances appropriate to describing them in the context of our experience of the world. Constituents of the context of our experience incorporate outer phenomena and cannot be adequately Let us consider cases of our needing to find out whether we believe something, a process which is arguably a fundamental feature of our lives, particularly our moral lives. The process need not involve a form of introspection or attending to our inner mental lives. For instance, Gareth Evans argues that in determining whether we believe that something is the case, we ordinarily do not inwardly glance toward an interior psychological realm. As he puts it: "If someone asks me 'Do you believe that there is going to be a third world war?', I must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were answering the question 'Will there be a third world war?'" 13 As Evans sees it, understanding the nature of our mental capacities, including the nature of belief, need not involve some scanning of our inner lives. In understanding the nature of belief and of whether or not we have a particular belief vital for understanding 9 our mystery, our "eyes are, so to speak, or occasionally literally, directed outwardupon the world." 14 This suggests that determining whether we have a belief that something is the case will be a matter, at least some of the time, of attending to the appearances in the wide-scope sense, to the features that constitute the ordinary and Interpreting appearances in the narrow, psychological sense is not an error as such. We can insist on the importance of the moral appearances without rendering them in purely psychological terms. The appearances have a fundamentally important methodological and phenomenological role in moral philosophy. For example, according to Aristotle, in ethical inquiry we ought to: "first set out the way things appear to people, and then, having gone through the puzzles, proceed to prove the received opinions about these ways of being affected -at best, all of them, or, failing that, most, and the most authoritative. For if the problems are resolved, and received opinions remain, we shall have offered sufficient proof." 16 Ideally, the appearances are saved by a philosophical account of the phenomena under question and our investigations, ideally, vindicate received opinions. In the context, Aristotle is embarking on a discussion of akrasia, although the principle of saving the appearances is one that has wide application. In contemporary moral theory, the use of this principle has been a central way to organize debates about whether forms of realism or expressivism offer the best account of our moral thought, practice, and discourse. 17 In the present context, the principle of saving the phenomena is also important for recognizing the different realms of appearance. For instance, taking the principle seriously means that in characterizing the moral phenomena we ought to attend to features of our experience that cannot be translated into the framework of mental states.
Whether or not an Aristotelian would endorse the idea that clarifying the appearances needs to focus exclusively on the character and interplay between mental states, Aristotle was not uninterested in psychology, and his deployment of the principle of saving the appearances shows that what falls within the scope of phenomena is complex and wide-ranging.
A Different Mystery?
What is constituted by the moral appearances is complex and we should proceed
carefully when considering what it is that we take as manifest in ordinary thought and discourse. Part of the assumption that our moral thought and experience can be translated into propositional attitudes reflects substantive commitments at the philosophical level, and this brings into question the legitimacy of idea that the appearances constitute a set of pre-philosophical data. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, for example, suggests that the moral problem or mystery in the standard formulation might be better thought of as a meta-ethical problem that emerges at the level of second-order analysis, once distinctively philosophical assumptions are operating. 18 Challenging the characterization of the mystery in this way does not exhibit skepticism about second order analyses as such but suggests that we need to take a view about whether the appearances that are at the focus of the standard formulation are in fact the shadows of technical and controversial theses in philosophical psychology and beyond. But, as
Smith explains: "what metaethical reflection suggests, at least initially, is that the very idea of being morally required to act in some way or other is all a total sham: nothing could be everything a moral requirement purports to be. When people become convinced moral skeptics for this sort of reason and then go on to acquire an indifference to the suffering of others, as so many certainly do, the problems the rest of us face become acute." 19 He adds that the cause of the first-order moral problem "is not the fact that moral thought is incoherent" but instead "the fact that it is believed to be incoherent when it is not." as independent of our inclinations and how this is "mysterious and wonderful." 23 As a rationalist alternative to the account of motivation and the wider philosophical psychology provided by a Humean framework, Kant offers a way to regard a certain type of reason as the essentially motivating force in ethics. 24 The kind of psychological approach to moral experience we have considered is often taken for granted and to a large extent it thus shapes what the initial problem or mystery is to which philosophers respond. For instance, according to Alison Denham:
"No doubt there really is much about morality which is genuinely mysterious, but that is because human psychology is mysterious." 25 In the context, the point is directed toward what she describes as an easy view in moral epistemology in which it is held that moral perception is a sui generis faculty of knowing. That thought, according to Denham, can be attractive to some of us since it "imbues moral phenomena with a pleasing air of mystery." 26 Viewing moral phenomena as mysterious could be pleasing, since it would apparently help preserve the autonomous character of ethics and thus protect against prevalent forms of reductionist naturalism, if we were inclined to feel the need for such protection. Denham suggests that the mystery of moral experience is a function of the mystery of human psychology; but there is no compelling reason why we must choose 12 between either accounting for the mystery in psychological terms or embracing the idea that the mystery is a result of some sui generis qualities or properties of moral phenomena wholly independent of psychology and a broader naturalist framework.
Concluding Remarks
The standard formulation of the mystery encourages us to attend to mental states, to the logic of propositional attitudes and their relations to the exclusion of other important features of moral experience. We cannot hope to describe adequately our moral experience if we characterize it in wholly psychological terms that are used to refer only to inward phenomena. The motivation for analyzing the ordinary features of experience in psychological terms comes from a tacit commitment to the primacy of psychology.
Overall, our moral thought and practice is said to contain a mystery or problem, but the mystery is generated by the incompatibility of mental states. The standard formulation need not explicitly restrict the focus on aspects of our psychology but there is, nevertheless, a problematic switch between domains of phenomena. An explanation of why our overall moral thought and practice contains a mystery ultimately will be framed in terms of psychological states even though the mystery is said to pervade our moral thought and discourse. What explains the occurrence of the mystery is that the complex array of outer phenomena can be interpreted as either being intellectual or practical which, in turn, are captured by the two cardinal psychological states of belief and desire. The relevant propositional attitudes have distinct metaphysical, semantic, and epistemological roles, but both share the same psychological space, as it were. Thus there has been a slide between two senses of the phenomena, an outward sense and an inner sense, and the two have been conflated.
Moral experience may nonetheless contain features that are difficult to reconcile or that our moral lives are in any sense mysterious. To neglect those aspects of our moral lives would be to neglect core features of our experience and to risk turning moral reflection, as Martha Nussbaum has put it something "hopelessly flat, tedious, underambitious." 27 Nevertheless, a particular account of what the mystery amounts to, one that is characterized as something that can be identified and explained with reference only to psychological considerations, is misleading. It is misleading because it runs together different domains of phenomena, and illicitly substitutes one for the other and by doing so presents a restrictive conception of what the mystery amounts to. In particular, it implies that the mystery is, in essence, a psychological mystery that comes 13 into view through analysis of mental states and their relations. As such, saving the phenomena becomes a task of describing the salient characteristics of our inner psychological lives.
What constitutes the ethical appearances is not a question that can be analyzed into a question about states of mind. As a contribution to the task of elucidating our moral experience, Smith has provided an influential framework for further discussion.
But there is more to the mystery or the problem of moral experience than can be accommodated by invoking propositional attitudes and the apparent tension between them. Providing a comprehensive and in-depth account of what the ordinary facts of moral experience amount to is an important and daunting task and we should do more than glancing inward if we want to understand what they are.
28
Notes
